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Policy Reform and the Economic Development of Tanzania 
 
David Potts* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the long-term economic performance of Tanzania since independence 
using long-term series of key economic and social indicators constructed from a variety of 
sources.  The disastrous export performance for most of the period under consideration can 
be attributed partly to domestic policy failures and partly to a hostile external environment.  
However inconsistent donor support to a highly aid dependent economy at times exacerbated 
the constraints imposed by persistent foreign exchange shortages.  Greater stability in 
funding and a more flexible policy dialogue are needed.  The extent to which a small and 
poor economy with a weak indigenous private sector can rely on foreign private investment 
to finance investment in the early stages of adjustment is questioned.  Investment in human 
capital beyond primary school level is also needed if growth is to be sustained. 
 
* Senior Lecturer, Bradford Centre for International Development (d.j.potts@bradford.ac.uk).  
I am grateful to the Britain-Tanzania Society for first inviting me to consider some of these 
issues and to my colleagues John Weiss, Sam Cameron, Anna Toner and Mike Tribe for 
valuable comments on an earlier draft.  
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Introduction 
In an address to the Tanzanian National Assembly on 8
th
 June 1965, President Julius Nyerere 
stated: 
“The amount of private investment which has taken place over the past year is, quite 
frankly a disappointment to us.  We have special tax concessions to encourage new 
investment; we have investment guarantees for bringing capital into the country; and 
we have many other arrangements designed to encourage private investment of a 
character which will serve our nation.  Yet the level of private investment does not 
appear to be as great as that provided for in the Plan.”  (Nyerere 1968:35) 
Thirty five years later a World Bank review of the Tanzanian economy stated: 
“Private investment, currently at 14 percent of GDP, has not responded quickly to the 
reform measures undertaken since the late 1980s and has not compensated for the 
decline of public investment. …… The weak response of private investment to economic 
reforms may also be related to the decline in complementary public investment (in the 
form of the provision of basic infrastructure and human and institutional capital), that 
is necessary for raising the overall absorptive capacity of the economy.”  (World Bank 
2001a:xvi) 
The former quotation eventually became an important part of the justification for the move 
towards the Tanzanian ujamaa
1
 policy and the Arusha Declaration that resulted in the 
nationalisation of the “major means of production and exchange” (Nyerere 1968: 233-4). 
The latter quotation is taken from a document in which it is later stated that: 
                                                 
1
  Ujamaa was a Tanzanian interpretation of African socialism associated with former President Julius 
Nyerere. 
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“One of the key lessons of Tanzania’s post-independence experience is the importance 
of clearly separating areas of public and private investment.  The principle source of 
investment has to be the private sector.” (World Bank 2001a:xxi) 
Clearly the same issue (i.e. the perceived inadequacy of the investment response of the 
private sector) has led to very different policy conclusions by different people at different 
points of time. 
This paper examines critically the Tanzanian experience with policy reform since 
independence
2
 and considers the impact of the reforms instigated by both internal and 
external agents to try to uncover some explanations for the growth performance of the 
economy and changes in human welfare.   
Tanzania is an important case when investigating long term development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa because it has shown remarkable political stability since independence and, apart from 
the war with Uganda in 1979 and a steady influx of refugees from less stable neighbours, has 
not been subject to the disruption associated with civil war or major natural disaster.  
National unity has been maintained and is reflected in the widespread use of Kiswahili as the 
national language.  In principle therefore it appears to have had some of the most important 
non-economic attributes required for steady progress.  Tanzania has also been a major 
recipient of aid from a wide variety of donors since the 1970s.  Despite these positive 
characteristics, the economic performance of Tanzania for much of the last forty years has 
been disappointing, although in the last ten years there has been a significant improvement.  
It is therefore important to consider the factors explaining this performance, whether the 
recent improvement can be sustained and whether it can deliver significant benefits for the 
poorest members of the population.   
                                                 
2
  GDP data are also given for the period immediately before independence but all other data relate to the post 
independence period.  For discussions of the pre-independence historical context to the Tanzanian economy 
see Coulson (1982) and Potts (2006). 
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Tanzania has undergone many policy changes since independence, first of all under the 
ujamaa policy and more recently through a steady process of liberalisation, which started in 
the early 1980s but is more commonly perceived as commencing with the agreement with the 
IMF in 1986.  Available data (see Table 1, also Figure 1) indicate that per capita GDP in 
2005 was approximately 36% above that of 1986 giving a real growth in per capita income of 
about 1.6% per annum over a 19 year period of liberalisation reforms, some improvement but 
hardly a spectacular success and nearly all of this growth has been achieved in the last ten 
years
3
.  Given the tendency for liberalisation to widen income disparities in the initial stage it 
is possible that the impact on the poorest Tanzanians could have been very low or even 
negative, particularly in the early years of reform. 
This paper examines the available data to determine the size and direction of changes in per 
capita income and broader indicators of welfare relating to poverty incidence and distribution 
over a long period.  These changes are then related to major policy issues and external factors 
over the same period.  Particular attention is given to the effect of policy changes on the 
agricultural sector and on export performance.  Among the questions asked are: 
 To what extent can changes in income and welfare be attributed to changes in policy 
and to what extent are external factors important? 
 Which policy reforms have worked and which have not? 
 Could the situation have improved if alternative strategies had been followed in the 
periods both before and after liberalisation? 
Before answering any of the above questions it is necessary to look at the evidence on 
Tanzanian development over the last forty to fifty years. 
                                                 
3
  An alternative comparison could be that GDP per capita was only 19% higher than in 1979, a period of 
twenty six years since the first tentative steps towards liberalisation. 
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Long Term Growth and Development in Tanzania: The Evidence 
The most easily available general indicator of development is the level of real GDP per 
capita.  It was necessary to combine series from two different sources to get a series that 
would cover all the years since independence as well as the period immediately prior to 
independence
4
.   The results give a reasonable overall impression of what has happened but 
the limitations of the data should be recognised.  To make some sense of what has happened 
it is useful to divide the series into a number of periods, most of which are separated by 
significant events.  The periods chosen were: 
 1954-1961 – the period immediately preceding independence 
 1961-1967 - the period immediately preceding the Arusha Declaration 
 1967-1973 - the period after the Arusha Declaration but preceding the second round 
of nationalisation and movement of the rural population into villages (villagisation) 
 1973-1979 – the period up to the war with Uganda including the impact of 
villagisation and further extension of the role of the state 
 1979-1986 – the period of economic crisis and dispute with the World Bank and IMF 
 1986-1995 – the first period of post-IMF agreement reform 
 1995- present – the current period of reform 
Indices for per capita GDP and related annual equivalent growth rates for the above periods 
are shown in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
4
  An explanation of the sources and approach used in compiling the GDP series is given in Annex A  
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Table 1  Index of Real Per Capita GDP 1954-2004 (1961=100) 
 
Year 1954 1961 1967 1973 1979 1986 1995 2005 
Real GDP per capita 98.2 100.0 122.0 130.5 130.0 113.9 112.4 154.4 
Annual growth in real 
per capita GDP
5
 
 0.3% 3.4% 1.1% 0.0% -2.2% -0.1% 2.8% 
 
Sources:  Compiled from: 
World Development Indicators (WDI) (2006) 
IMF International Financial Statistics (various issues)  
World Bank (1994) 
It can be seen that the only periods of rapid growth in per capita GDP were the initial period 
after independence and the last ten years.  Some growth in real per capita GDP took place in 
the period following the Arusha Declaration up until 1976, but the growth from 1974-6 was 
associated with unusually high prices for sisal and coffee.  Real per capita GDP (1992 prices) 
fell consistently from a peak of TSh. 57243 in 1976 to TSh. 47743 in 1986, a drop of over 
16%.  There was a slow recovery after 1986 up to 1990 with a decline of nearly 8% between 
1991 and 1994 followed by a faster recovery from 1995 onwards.  The net effect was a level 
of per capita GDP in 2005 that was about 26% above the level in 1967, about 54% above the 
level at independence and about 57% above the level fifty years previously. 
Over a long period relatively small differences in performance can make a significant 
difference if maintained consistently.  If the economic performance in the six years 
immediately following independence had been sustained, per capita GDP in Tanzania would 
be about three times the current level.  Even if the performance in the period immediately 
after the Arusha declaration had been sustained, per capita GDP in 2005 would have been 
about 30% higher.  The period between 1973 and 1985 can therefore be seen in many 
respects to have been one of lost opportunity.  
                                                 
5
  In this and other tables where growth rates are shown the figure given is the annualised compound rate of 
growth between the start and end years. 
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It is not just the growth of GDP per capita that is important.  It is also important to assess the 
extent to which there has been structural change in Tanzania and the impact of changes on 
different segments of the population and on indicators of social development. 
Assessment of changes in the composition of real GDP depends to some extent on the 
composition of the basket of goods used to deflate the GDP estimates as well as the approach 
used to measure subsistence output.  Changes in both the composition of the goods produced 
and the relative prices of different goods can have a significant effect over a long time period 
and so judgements have to be made carefully.  Nevertheless it is fairly clear that the relative 
size of the largest sector, agriculture, declined steadily from over 50% of GDP at 
independence to under 40% in the mid 1970s, increased back to just over 50% by 1987 and 
declined back to about 45% by 2004
6
.  In other words, in terms of the structural 
transformation of an essentially agrarian economy the current situation is not very different 
from the situation at the time of the Arusha Declaration.   
Overall the relative importance of agriculture has declined to about 83% of the level at 
independence implying that the real per capita value of agricultural production in 2005 was 
about 28% above the value at that time.  Over the same period the proportion of the 
population living in the rural areas has declined from about 95% in 1964 to just under 76% in 
2005 (WDI 2006).  If all agricultural production were undertaken by the rural population this 
would imply that the real value of agricultural production per rural person had increased by 
about 60% since 1961, equivalent to about 1.1% per annum.  However, since there is 
considerable agricultural production in some urban areas and there are significant 
contributions of agricultural labour made by the urban-based population, the actual growth in 
productivity has probably been lower than this.   
                                                 
6
  See Ellis and Mdoe (2003: 1369) for some observations on the reliability of estimates of the sector share of 
agriculture. 
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Agriculture has therefore not been a leading sector, rather a stabilising factor moderating the 
negative effects of periods of economic decline and declining in relative importance in 
periods of relatively faster growth.  However, given the increase in the urban population it is 
clear that average urban productivity has declined quite considerably. 
Per capita GDP is an imperfect indicator of welfare since it takes no account of factors that 
are not included in the measure and no account of distribution.  Other relevant indicators of 
welfare include those that relate to levels of education and health and access to clean water.  
Indicators of inequality are also important, especially where the structural changes have 
differential effects on different segments of the population.  Unfortunately reliable long time 
series are not always available for these indicators and so evidence is more impressionistic. 
In the field of access to primary education, Tanzania made great strides in the 1970s with the 
policy of Education for Self Reliance
7
.  However, as time went by, this progress became 
increasingly threatened by resource constraints and the quality of education for many 
deteriorated (World Bank 2001a: 32).  Gross enrolment ratios rose rapidly from 32% in 1965 
to a peak of 94% in 1981 but then fell back again to 66% in 1996 (Table 2, Figure 2).  More 
recently primary school enrolment has risen again as a result of the abolition of primary 
education fees (URT 2002a: 19) and reached 87% in 2002 (WDI 2006).  The gross enrolment 
rate exceeded 100% in 2005 and the net enrolment rate was over 90% (WDI 2006).  
As a result of the massive expansion in primary education in the 1970s and early 1980s adult 
illiteracy fell rapidly from 63% in 1970 to 35% in 1991.  Adult illiteracy continued to fall 
despite the fall in primary school enrolment and was down to about 31% in 2004 (WDI 
2006).  The gender gap in education has also narrowed with primary school enrolment rates 
for girls now being more or less the same as for boys, although the gender gap in illiteracy 
rates will take longer to disappear. 
                                                 
7
  This policy was outlined in a speech made by Nyerere in 1967 (Nyerere 1968: 267-290). 
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Table 2  Indicators of Educational Achievement 1965-2001 
 
Year 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2004 
Primary School Gross 
Enrolment Ratio (%) 
32% 34% 53% 93% 75% 70% 67% 101% 
Adult Illiteracy (%) n.a. 64% 58% 51% 44% 37% 31% 31% 
 
Sources:  World Bank Africa Database (WBAD) 2004 
     WDI 2006 
World Bank (2004) health indicators show a steady improvement in infant mortality rates 
until 1985 followed by a slight deterioration, partly as a consequence of HIV/AIDS (URT 
2002a: 27), and a more recent improvement (WDI 2006).  There is some evidence that the 
general improvement in infant mortality may not have been reflected in the infant mortality 
rate for the bottom income quintile (World Bank 2001a: 36), but evidence is mixed and all 
that is clear is that infant mortality is lowest for the highest income quintile.  Evidence on 
malnutrition of children also suggests growing differentiation with a deterioration recorded 
for the lowest asset level groups (ibid).  The deterioration in health indicators between 1987 
and 1992 may be a reflection of the initial impact of the post 1986 adjustment policies on 
health expenditure but the decline in life expectancy since 1985 is a clear indication of the 
seriousness of the impact of HIV/AIDS. 
Table 3  Indicators of Health Status 1965-1999 
 
Year 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2004 
Infant Mortality per 1000 
live births  
136 129 118 106 100 102 100 78 
Average Life Expectancy 
at birth (years) 
  43   46   48   50   51   50   49   46 
 
Source:  WBAD 2004 
 WDI 2006 
Reliable data on access to clean water are not readily available, but there is some evidence of 
a significant improvement from 46% of the population with access to improved water sources 
 11 
in 1990 increasing to 62% in 2004 (WDI 2006).  In the rural areas most of this improvement 
is due to the increased use of protected wells and springs rather than access to piped water 
(URT 2002a: 39) and Tanzanian government figures suggest a lower figure (55%) for 
households with access to piped or protected drinking water (URT 2002b: 23).  There has 
been no significant improvement in access to improved sanitation facilities. 
Evidence on inequality is mixed.  Standard measures of the Gini coefficient suggest an 
increase in inequality from 1969 to 1991.  There was apparently a decrease in inequality 
between 1991 and 1993 followed by a subsequent increase (World Bank 2002: 35).  A recent 
estimate of the Gini coefficient indicated that inequality in 2000/1 was greater than in 1991/2 
(URT 2002a: 10).  Although the evidence is not conclusive, it is likely that inequality has 
increased since per capita GDP reached a peak in 1976 that was only reached again in 2003.  
It is therefore quite likely that the incomes of the poorest part of the population are still lower 
than they were in 1976. 
Unfortunately there are insufficient consistent and comparable data on poverty status to allow 
definitive judgements to be made about changes over time in poverty indicators (World Bank 
2002: 89).  According to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), incidence of poverty 
declined between 1983 and 1993 but increased from 1993 to 1998 (URT 2000: 7).  Poverty 
headcount ratios for 1991/2 and 2000/1 indicate a slight decrease in poverty in relation to 
both food and basic needs (URT 2002a: 7).  It is therefore probable (but not certain) that, 
despite some growth in inequality, the improvement in economic performance in the post 
reform period may have slightly reduced the extent of poverty although not necessarily the 
depth of poverty for the poorest part of the population.   
Overall the evidence suggests that Tanzania has performed slightly better in terms of social 
provision than in general economic performance.  This is reflected in positive changes in the 
Human Development Index during the 1990s (World Bank 2002: 92).  However this 
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improvement is threatened in a number of areas for the poorest section of the population 
because of inequality and inadequate funding of the social sectors and also because of the 
impact of HIV/AIDS. 
A striking feature of Tanzania‟s economic performance has been the long-term decline of the 
real value of per capita foreign exchange earnings from both merchandise exports and 
invisible earnings (Table 4, Figure 3).  Absolute values obscure the significance of the 
decline because the population in 2004 was more than three times the level at independence.  
Per capita merchandise exports reached a peak in 1966 and declined more or less 
continuously until 1988 by which time they were little more than 10% of the value in 1966.  
Although there has been some recovery since then, by 2004 they were still only just over 
20% of the 1966 value.  This picture is mirrored to some extent by the performance of 
invisible earnings, principally from tourism.  In per capita terms these reached a peak in 
1970, declined to a low of just under 13% of the 1970 level by 1986, but recovered more 
quickly to 47% of the peak level by 2004. 
Until relatively recently, when exports of fish and minerals have increased substantially, there 
had been almost no structural change in the nature of Tanzanian exports.  Despite negative 
trends in both production and prices, the six major export crops
8
 accounted for over 50% of 
exports in nearly all years until 1999 (Table 4).    
The capacity of Tanzanians to earn foreign exchange has therefore declined drastically 
leading to very heavy dependence on other sources, principally aid.  It can be further 
surmised that the inability of Tanzania to generate export earnings was a major constraining 
factor on the growth of the economy.  So why did this happen?  In the analysis that follows 
issues have been divided into those that are primarily of external origin and those that 
primarily relate to internal policies and actions.  Of course these issues cannot be entirely 
                                                 
8
  The six major crops are coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, sisal and cashewnuts. 
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separated in reality but it is worth considering the relative importance of factors that were 
within the control either of the Tanzanian government or the donor community or both. 
Table 4  Sources of Foreign Exchange 1961-2004  
(period averages, constant 1961 prices, IUV deflator
9
) 
Year 1961-6 1967-72 1973-9 1980-5 1986-94 1995-04 
Absolute Value  
($ million) 
Merchandise exports 
Services 
Aid 
Net FDI 
 
 
176.5 
  28.8 
  35.3 
n.a. 
 
 
202.1 
  62.8 
  37.0 
      3.7
*
 
 
 
129.3 
  41.7 
  82.5 
    1.2 
 
 
  72.0 
  31.2 
109.5 
    1.5 
 
 
  55.8 
  29.4 
151.9 
    1.2 
 
 
  85.1 
  63.5 
122.0 
  28.1 
Per Capita ($) 
Merchandise exports 
Services 
Aid 
Net FDI 
 
  15.8 
    2.6 
    3.2 
   n.a. 
 
  15.1 
    4.6 
    2.7 
     0.3
a
 
 
    7.9 
    2.5 
    4.9 
    0.1 
 
    3.6 
    1.5 
    5.4 
    0.1 
 
    2.1 
    1.1 
    5.8 
    0.0 
 
    2.4 
    1.8 
    3.5 
    0.8 
Per capita growth within 
period (% per annum) 
Merchandise exports 
Services 
Aid 
Net FDI 
 
 
    6.6% 
    7.3% 
-10.2% 
  n.a. 
 
 
  -3.9% 
    8.3% 
    3.9% 
  n.a. 
 
 
-12.9% 
-12.0% 
  13.1% 
-17.7% 
 
 
 -14.9% 
   -4.6% 
   -7.5% 
    5.5% 
 
 
     0.4% 
     0.8% 
   -0.2% 
     6.0% 
 
 
   5.6% 
   1.1% 
   2.0% 
  12.9% 
Traditional export crops 
as % of total exports 
  
57.9%
b
 
 
50.2% 
 
61.4% 
 
58.9% 
 
58.4% 
 
41.8% 
 
Sources:   Own estimates based on World Bank, IMF and Tanzanian government sources 
 
a
  Figures from 1970-2 only
10
.   
 
b
  1965-6  
 
   
 
External Factors 
 
A number of external factors have had an impact on the Tanzanian economy in the past forty 
years.  The most important of these have been: 
                                                 
9
  Estimates of real values were derived by using an import unit value (IUV) index for Tanzania as a deflator.  
The IUV index was compiled from IMF and World Bank sources.  Explanation of the compilation of the 
import and export unit value indices used in this paper is given in Annex B. 
10  Net FDI in 1961-8 was negative in most years (Coulson 1982: 174). 
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 Changes in the real prices of major export crops.  In most periods this has been a 
negative external factor, but there have also been some periods of unusually high 
export prices (Table 5, Figures 4 and 5). 
 Changes in oil prices.  Tanzania does not produce oil and was therefore vulnerable to 
the oil price shocks of the 1970s.  However the 1970s was also a period of relatively 
high prices for Tanzanian agricultural exports (Table 5, Figure 4). 
 The debt crisis.  As with all highly indebted developing countries Tanzania suffered 
significantly when the negative real rates of interest of the 1970s changed to positive 
real rates that were very high by historical standards in the 1980s. 
 The break up of the East African Community (EAC).  This reduced the potential for 
trade between the three East African countries and also tended to reinforce the 
concentration of foreign investment in Kenya, which was perceived to be a more 
attractive investment location during the 1970s and 1980s. 
 The Ugandan war.  It can be argued that this was in fact a conscious decision made by 
the Tanzanian government, but there was an unfulfilled hope that the removal of the 
Amin regime would be perceived externally as a public good and therefore that other 
countries would help with the estimated $500 million cost of the invasion (Avirgan 
and Honey 1983:196).  Failure to secure such help drained Tanzania‟s foreign 
exchange reserves and helped precipitate the economic crisis of the early 1980s. 
 The incidence of HIV/AIDS.  Again this is not entirely outside the influence of the 
Tanzanian government and people but it has been a major negative factor since 
the1980s over which the government has had limited influence. 
 Aid policy.  Tanzania has received a relatively large amount of aid but has been 
subjected to changing policy priorities of the aid donors, increasing conditionality and 
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periods of policy driven aid cuts.  Inappropriate aid programmes and inadequate aid 
co-ordination have also been seen as issues (Wangwe 1997, Booth 2003).   
Not all of the above factors are readily amenable to quantitative analysis, but evidence on the 
impact of commodity price movements can be assessed.  An index of unit values for 
traditional export crop prices was constructed based on a weighted average of the prices of 
the six main export crops.  In order not to allow changing patterns of export crop production 
to distort the price index, a single set of volume weights based on the average volume of 
exports for each crop was applied to the unit value of each crop in each year in constant 1965 
prices ($US).  A summary of the evidence is shown in Table 5 (see also Figure 4).  It can be 
seen that the price index declined in every period except 1973-9.  Declining real values for 
Tanzanian traditional export commodities have therefore been an important negative factor 
for most of the period under study.  By 2004 the real unit value of traditional export crop 
prices was less than half of the level at the beginning of the period.  A unit volume index is 
also shown both in absolute and per capita terms.  While the unit volume per capita declines 
steadily, it can be seen that the decline in unit volumes does not always follow the decline in 
export prices very closely.  In particular the relatively favourable terms of trade in the mid 
1970s were accompanied by a decline in both per capita and absolute export volume.  Falling 
export prices therefore do not entirely explain the decline in export values. 
Table 5 and Figure 5 also show more general measures of the movement of the terms of trade 
for all Tanzanian exports
11
.  For most of the period the figures are very similar, but recently 
the declining relative importance of traditional export crops has caused some divergence 
between the unit value index for traditional export crops and the overall terms of trade.  In 
                                                 
11
  This series was computed by joining together overlapping series for import and export unit values from 
World Bank and IMF sources.  Inevitably there is a significant margin of error because of the different 
weights used in the different series.  Nevertheless the orders of magnitude should give a reasonable 
indication of movements in the terms of trade over time (see Annex B). 
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particular favourable movements in the prices of mineral exports have had a significant 
positive effect on the terms of trade in the last five years. 
 
Table 5  Indices of Real Unit Values and Volume for Traditional Export Crops and 
Commodity Terms of Trade 1965-2004 (period averages, 1965=100) 
Period 1965-6 1967-72 1973-9 1980-85 1986-94 1995-04 
Real Unit Value Index 99.1 90.3 93.6 74.0 61.0 40.0 
Average Annual change  -1.8% 1.2% -3.3% -2.4% -3.7% 
Unit Volume Index (UVI) 112.9 113.7 88.6 63.4 60.6 77.7 
UVI per capita  111.0 100.7 62.9 36.2 27.1 26.6 
Average Annual change  -4.2% -10.6% -8.8% 0.6% -2.0% 
Terms of Trade  
(period average) 
99.3 80.5 89.6 70.5 62.2 47.7 
Average Annual change 
(period start to end) 
 -2.7% 2.7% -3.9%   -2.7% -1.2% 
 
Source:  Own estimates based on World Bank, IMF and Bank of Tanzania data.
12
 
 
The economic impact of HIV/AIDS has been serious.  Although such estimates are subject to 
a significant margin of error, it is estimated that the effect of HIV/AIDS on economic growth 
has been in the region of 0.7% per year (World Bank 2001a:xxv).  This impact would have 
started at a relatively low level in the mid 1980s and increased steadily until the mid to late 
1990s after which it has probably been fairly stable.  The relatively good economic 
performance since 1995 has therefore been achieved despite the negative impact of 
HIV/AIDS.    
Aid policy has been a significant factor in Tanzanian economic performance and is an 
important source of foreign exchange.  Real per capita aid to Tanzania increased rapidly from 
independence, reaching a peak in 1979 (Figure 6).  Due to disagreements between Tanzania 
                                                 
12
  It should be noted that during the crisis period recorded exports are a significant underestimate of actual 
exports because there were strong incentives to export through unofficial channels at parallel market prices.  
This is a relevant factor in the relative resilience of the Tanzanian economy during the crisis period but 
clearly the foreign exchange earned in this way was not available for use in the official economy. 
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and the major multilateral and bilateral donors over exchange rate policy, the real value of aid 
per capita then declined steadily during the crisis period until 1985.  Real per capita aid 
increased following the 1986 agreement with the IMF reaching another peak in 1988 but fell 
significantly after further disagreement and only recovered slowly after renewed agreement 
(Table 6, Figure 6).   
Table 6  Index and Growth of Real Value of Aid per Capita 1961-2004  
(Indices 1961=100) 
 
Period  1961-72 1973-79 1980-85 1986-92 1993-97 1998-04  
Start  100.0 94.1   164.9 143.5     97.7    60.4 
End    73.2 173.8   108.9 174.9     53.0   129.7 
Period Average   79.2 130.5   143.0 169.7     83.4     98.1 
Aid as % of Exports 
(period average) 
19.1% 63.9% 152.0% 294.8% 148.8% 155.7% 
 
Source:  Own estimates derived from World Development Indicators (2006)
13
. 
 
Given that the value of aid has been more than the value of exports in every year since 1979 
and that it has been a major source of fixed capital formation it can be argued that fluctuation 
in aid flows has been an important contributory factor to instability in Tanzanian economic 
performance, significantly exacerbating the declines in real per capita income experienced in 
1981-5 and 1992-5. 
In terms of the periods under consideration, the initial post independence period was marked 
by a slow but steady decline in unit export values compensated for by a steady increase in aid 
– a broadly neutral external environment, although aid flows were influenced in some years 
by political disagreements with Germany and the UK over the recognition of the GDR and 
the response to UDI in Rhodesia respectively.   
                                                 
13
  The figures in Table 6 are very sensitive to the deflator used (in this case a linked series for the Import Unit 
Value (IUV) Index for Tanzania).   The IUV index is very sensitive to changes in oil prices because of the 
relative importance of oil imports and this has a significant effect on the estimates of the real value of aid. 
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The period between 1973 and 1979 was one in which the external environment was generally 
favourable.  Per capita aid increased and was accompanied by generally favourable export 
prices.  Real interest rates for much of this period were negative giving rise to cheap loans for 
borrower countries.  The oil price shocks at the beginning and end of the period had some 
negative effects but these would have been less important if export volumes had responded to 
the positive price changes for sisal and coffee.  The break up of the EAC may have had some 
negative effect on inward investment, but it could be argued that internal factors were more 
important in discouraging investors and that inward foreign investment was very low before 
the break up. 
The period from 1980 to 1985 was one in which external factors played a significant negative 
role.  The Uganda war exhausted Tanzania‟s foreign exchange reserves, export prices were in 
steep decline and from 1981 onwards there was a rapid decline in per capita aid provision
14
.  
Added to this Tanzania was affected like other indebted developing countries by the impact 
of the rising real cost of servicing debt
15
.  The external environment was therefore very 
hostile.  Given these negative factors what is surprising is not that the economy declined but 
that it did not decline by more
16
. 
                                                 
14
  The decline in aid volume came about because aid donors were becoming disenchanted with Tanzania‟s 
internal policies, in part because the political climate in the donor countries shifted significantly to the right 
and the external perception of Tanzania‟s socialist policies had changed from one of support for its 
egalitarian principles to one of hostility to its antipathy to market led solutions.  See Bigsten et al. (2001:  
294-5) 
15
  This problem was caused by the failure of interest rates to fall in line with the fall in inflation rates in lending 
countries.  The real cost of servicing a given debt is determined by the real value of payments of interest and 
loan principal.  In periods of high inflation of lender currencies the real value of these payments for any loan 
declines rapidly during the lifetime of the loan.  This does not happen when inflation of the lender currency 
is low.    
16
  Bevan et al (1988) provide evidence from household budget surveys using parallel market prices suggesting 
that the decline in real incomes may have been significantly greater than the official data suggest. 
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From 1986 to 1991 Tanzania continued to face low real export prices, but this was partly 
compensated by a substantial increase in aid.  The real value of aid fell between 1993 and 
1997, although this was partly offset by improved coffee prices in 1994 and 1995.  Export 
prices then fell again while aid levels recovered.  For most of the period following the 1986 
agreement the external environment was fairly hostile in relation to export prices and the real 
cost of debt service but improved in relation to aid apart from the period 1993-7.  More 
recently the external environment in relation to debt service has improved significantly with 
the HIPC initiative.  Foreign direct investment finally began to make a significant net 
contribution to foreign exchange inflows from 1995 onwards but was still only 23% of the 
value of aid and 33% of the value of merchandise exports in the period 1995-2004 (WDI 
2006).   
Overall the impact of external factors has been mixed but mostly either neutral or negative 
apart from the mid 1970s when it might be said to have been positive.  External factors were 
therefore important, but the economic performance of Tanzania cannot be explained solely in 
these terms.  It is also necessary to look at the impact of the policies followed by the 
Tanzanian government, particularly in the period prior to the 1980s when it might be argued 
that the Tanzanian government had greater room for manoeuvre.  
 
Internal Policy Changes 
 
The period immediately following independence was one in which the Tanzanian 
government followed a conventional import substitution policy relying largely on private 
investors in the industrial sector and a combination of smallholder farmers and large scale 
private farms in the agricultural sector.  There was a significant increase in the level of 
investment rising to 18.9% of GDP in 1967 (Bigsten et al 2001: 313) but this was still 
regarded as insufficient by the political leadership.  In particular there was disappointment at 
 20 
the lack of investment by the private sector in areas regarded as priorities in the First 
Tanzanian Five Year Plan.   
Table 7 and Figure 7 show gross fixed investment as a proportion of GDP along with the 
average growth rate of GDP in the corresponding period.  Paradoxically the two periods of 
highest growth have the lowest rates of investment, a clear indication that the productivity of 
investment in the period 1973-85 was very low (World Bank 2001a: 24-5)
17
. 
Table 7  Gross Fixed Investment as % of GDP and Real GDP Growth 1961-2004  
(period averages) 
 
Period 1961-6 1967-72 1973-9 1980-85 1986-95 1996-04 
GFI (% of GDP) 12.8% 21.2% 27.3% 25.6%. 22.5% 16.7% 
Real GDP Growth Rate 6.5% 4.4% 3.3% 1.1% 3.2% 5.1% 
 
Source: Own estimates based on World Bank sources.   
 
Major changes were introduced with the Arusha Declaration in 1967, which provided a 
blueprint for the development of Tanzanian socialism.  The initial changes extended the role 
of the state to cover the „commanding heights‟ of the economy.  These were interpreted to 
include the main elements of the financial sector, most large-scale industries and a significant 
proportion of the large-scale agricultural sector (Nyerere 1968: 251-256).   
The initial impact of these changes on economic growth was not particularly great.  
Investment continued to grow and exceeded 20% of GDP from 1970 onwards, but the 
relative importance of public sector investment in total investment increased dramatically 
from 31.6% in 1965 to 63.8% in 1970 (World Bank 2002: 125).  Two other interrelated 
factors came into play that had implications for subsequent developments.  In 1969 Tanzania 
achieved a current account surplus on the balance of payments for the last time.  From 1970 
                                                 
17
  For some revealing cases of poor investments see Coulson ed. (1979: 175-190) and Coulson (1982: 279-
282). 
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onwards foreign exchange shortages were a regular feature
18
 and Tanzania started on the road 
towards dependence on aid to finance the gap between export earnings and import 
requirements.  Tanzania also maintained a fixed exchange rate pegged to the dollar until 1974 
at a time when internal inflation, although not particularly high, was higher than that of her 
major trading partners.  Although the problem of appreciation of the real exchange rate 
(RER) is more commonly associated with the early 1980s, the shilling appreciated by about 
50% in the late 1960s thereby initiating the process of erosion of the competitiveness of 
export crops (Table 8, Figure 8).    
Table 8  Index of Real Exchange Rate 1961-2004  
(period averages, 1961=100) 
 
Period 1961-6 1967-72 1973-9 1980-85 1986-95 1996-04 
Real Exchange Rate 97.8 142.3 142.8 227.8. 85.6 76.5 
Average Annual change 0.8% 2.7% 0.0% 15.1% -15.0% -0.7% 
 
Source: Own estimates based on World Bank and IMF sources.   
  A positive sign indicates appreciation of the real exchange rate 
Further major policy changes were introduced in 1973 and the subsequent few years.  The 
most important change was the process of villagisation
19
, justified partly by the desire to 
provide social services to the villages and partly by the aim to create more communal forms 
of production in the rural areas.  The impact of this change varied from location to location 
with the most severe disruption to production occurring in areas with scattered settlement 
patterns where farmers were unable to maintain perennial crops that were located too far from 
                                                 
18
  Green et al. (1980) provide a review of the factors affecting the balance of payments situation in Tanzania 
during the 1970s that is sympathetic to the Tanzanian government policies at the time.  A more critical 
review of Tanzanian policy during this period can be found in Bevan et al. (1990 Appendix 6). 
19
  Villagisation was the process of bringing farmers who lived in scattered settlements together into villages.  
At first this was seen as a voluntary policy but impatience with slow progress led to compulsory resettlement 
of a large proportion of the rural population in the period 1973-5.  Useful accounts can be seen in von 
Freyhold (1979), Coulson (1982 Ch. 22) and Hyden (Ch. 4 and 5). 
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their new homes.  Production of cashewnuts was particularly badly affected and declined 
from 143,300 tonnes in 1973/4 to 57,100 tonnes in 1978/9 (URT 1984:8). 
Agricultural production was also affected by the abolition of the regional co-operative unions 
in 1976 and their replacement by parastatal marketing boards.  This change affected the 
delivery of services to farmers, particularly for export crops, and also contributed to high 
marketing costs thereby reducing the prices paid to farmers below what they otherwise might 
have been
20
.  The inefficiency of the parastatals, combined in some cases with mixed 
priorities and unclear objectives
21
, therefore contributed to the poor supply response of the 
export sector to the relatively favourable external environment of the 1970s.  
During the period 1973-9 international inflation rates were generally as high as those in 
Tanzania and the RER did not change very much.  However this period saw a rapid extension 
of price controls over a wide range of products as well as a foreign exchange allocation 
process to cope with periodic foreign exchange shortages.  These shortages occurred despite 
this being the only period in which the terms of trade were generally favourable.   
The widening of controls over prices and resource allocation contributed significantly to a 
number of problems.  First of all the process increased the demand for skilled labour to 
administer the expanding role of the public sector.  This was problematic because, while 
Tanzanian education policy had concentrated resources on expansion of primary education 
for reasons of equity, the proportions of the population receiving secondary and tertiary 
education were among the lowest in the world and had actually declined since independence 
(World Bank 2001a: x).  Tanzania therefore did not have the human resources needed to 
administer the system it had adopted, resulting in low levels of technical and managerial 
                                                 
20
  Ellis (1983) estimated that the proportion of the world price of the six major export crops obtained by 
farmers fell from 70.3% to 41.7% between 1970 and 1980. 
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efficiency (Van Arkadie 2005: 123-4).  Secondly the shortages created by these controls led 
to rising levels of rent seeking behaviour.  These were reflected in the increasing importance 
of parallel markets for essential commodities and foreign exchange
22
.  Essentially the state 
had taken on responsibilities beyond its capacity for effective implementation.  This led to 
several policy reversals in cases where the impact was clearly negative from the outset
23
. 
The 1979 Uganda war ushered in a period of acute economic crisis, which lasted until an 
agreement was reached with the IMF in 1986.  During this period the Tanzanian government 
attempted to introduce a number of reforms, but these were regarded by most of the donor 
community as too little and too late.  The principle issue of dispute was the exchange rate.  
While the government did devalue the Shilling in 1982, 1983 and 1984 by 10%, 20% and 
26% respectively, it was only the third devaluation that was sufficiently large to prevent 
continued appreciation of the RER.  Part of the reason for this was the high level of internal 
inflation, but another major reason was the deflationary policies followed by major developed 
economies, which caused their inflation rates to fall very rapidly.  It is possible that the 
Tanzanian government was rather slow to realise the significance of the diversion in inflation 
rates for the competitive position of exporters, but there was also a view that the exchange 
rate was an issue of national sovereignty and that the devaluation demands of the IMF and the 
World Bank were excessive.
24
.   
                                                                                                                                                        
21
  Examples of these are the investments of the Sisal Authority in sisal processing capacity and diversification 
schemes at a time when production of sisal fibre was falling.  Similarly the Cashewnut Authority invested 
with World Bank support in cashew processing factories at a time when cashewnut production was falling. 
22
  The ratio of the parallel market price for foreign exchange to the official rate increased steadily from 2.2 in 
1979 to 3.8 in 1985 (World Bank Africa database 2004).  Other sources indicate that the rate was sometimes 
even higher during this period (e.g. Kimei cited in Bevan et al 1990: 328, Lofchie cited in Hyden and 
Karlstrom 1993: 1398). 
23
  A notorious example was „Operation Maduka‟ in 1976, a failed attempt to close down private retailers and 
replace them with co-operative shops (Hyden 1980: 132-3). 
24
  Bigsten et al. (2001: 316-320) provide an interesting discussion of the debates going on at this time.  The 
view expressed suggests that prime responsibility for intransigence lay with the Tanzanian government.  
 24 
The Tanzanian Government produced a National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) in 
1981, which removed export taxes, but otherwise did not go much further than exhortation 
(Morrissey 1995: 642, Bigsten et al. 2001: 317).  A more comprehensive process of reform 
was initiated with a home-grown Structural Adjustment Programme (1982-4) which proposed 
a strategy based on the revival of traditional export crops.  This was followed, in 1983, by the 
Agricultural Policy of Tanzania, in which the role of the private sector and the need for 
security of land tenure were explicitly recognised and a policy decision was made for the co-
operative unions to be reintroduced.   
Efforts were made to draw up programmes defining the requirements for investment and 
recurrent resources for the traditional export crops (URT 1984
25
) but they depended on 
support from the donor community, which was not forthcoming without agreement with the 
IMF, and investment by the private sector, which was unwilling to invest in what was 
perceived to be a risky environment
26
.  Nevertheless these programmes did embody a number 
of significant reforms including some proposals for the sale of non-performing public sector 
estates to the private sector.  There were also reductions in the number of products subject to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Other useful discussions of the debates include Biermann and Wagao (1986), Hyden and Karlstrom (1993) 
and Holtom (2005).  A common theme was the critical role of President Nyerere and some of his closest 
advisors in resisting the perceived „take it or leave it‟ attitude of the IMF in negotiation.  Another theme was 
the failure of Nyerere and his advisors to fully understand the economic implications both of devaluation and 
of failure to devalue.  My own personal experience was that there was significant internal pressure for 
reform but the task of the reformers was made more difficult by the refusal of the IMF and the World Bank 
to compromise on hard line positions.   The size and speed of exchange rate adjustment demanded was not 
even viewed as particularly helpful by some private sector exporters, who argued for a steady depreciation.  
The view expressed by some was that a very rapid change would make it more difficult to finance the 
foreign exchange costs of the rehabilitation needed to restore production and take advantage of exchange 
rate changes (personal communications during fieldwork collecting information for the Ministry of 
Agriculture on private sector requirements in 1984-5).  
25
  The original document covering the six major export crops as well as pyrethrum and cocoa was followed up 
by more detailed programmes and investment proposals for each crop. 
 25 
price control and the beginnings of liberalisation of the foreign exchange allocation system.  
Some attempts were made to reverse the deterioration in the real value of producer prices to 
farmers, but deteriorating terms of trade and an appreciating RER meant that these measures 
worsened the deficits of the parastatals and exacerbated the problem of controlling 
government expenditure
27
. 
In terms of policy measures the reforms of the early 1980s were significant in that they 
signalled a reversal of the trend of the previous decade towards public sector dominance of 
all major economic functions.  An indication of this change was that the share of public 
investment in total fixed capital formation fell back to about 40% in 1980 and 35% in 1985 
(World Bank 2002: 125).  Given the crisis state of the economy, the proportion of investment 
to GDP remained surprisingly high but the productivity of that investment was clearly 
constrained by the economic conditions. With the progressive withdrawal of support from the 
donor community the economic crisis continued.  In 1985 there was no devaluation and the 
reform process was stalled, partly because this was the final year of Nyerere‟s presidency.  
By this time the RER had appreciated to over three times the level of 1961, a position that 
was clearly unsustainable in the long run, especially when the terms of trade had also moved 
against Tanzania. 
By 1985 the economic crisis had caused severe strains on the physical and social 
infrastructure of the country.  While adult literacy was still improving as a result of past 
efforts, schools and health centres were unable to deliver effective services.  Primary school 
enrolment started to decline and the improvement in health indicators slowed down.  The 
                                                                                                                                                        
26
  It is nevertheless interesting to note that real net foreign direct investment was actually higher in the period 
1980-1985 than it was in the period from the IMF agreement up to 1994 (see Table 4). 
27
  Between 1981 and 1984 government transfers to the crop authorities increased from 3.3% to nearly 9% of 
government recurrent expenditure (World Bank 1996: Vol. 2: 36). 
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physical infrastructure also suffered and this was reflected in a rapidly deteriorating road 
system and inability to expand provision of utilities in line with demand.  
In 1986 the new government under President Mwinyi reached agreement with the IMF under 
the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP).  The agreed package involved an initial massive 
63% devaluation
28
 followed by a steady depreciation to eliminate exchange rate 
overvaluation by 1988.  By that time the RER had already fallen below the 1961 level.  
Measures were to be taken to control public expenditure, raise interest rates and liberalise 
both internal and external trade.   
Growth of the economy resumed, but after a temporary boom in 1986, real exports continued 
to decline until 1993 and did not recover to 1984 levels until 1994.  Fixed capital formation 
declined as a proportion of GDP, mainly as a result of the effects of restrictions on public 
expenditure, but also because the private sector response to reform was disappointing.  Aid 
levels recovered but Tanzania was even more aid dependent than before.  The hoped-for 
inflow of foreign investment failed to materialise.  Some privatisation measures were taken 
but it was not until 1991 that pressure to reform the financial sector was embodied in the 
Financial Sector Adjustment Programme.  External pressure for more rapid privatisation in 
this area was at least partly responsible for the breakdown in the agreement with donors in 
1992.  Bigsten et al (2001: 323-4) argue that lack of fiscal discipline and resistance to 
measures to control tax evasion and other rent seeking behaviour caused a breakdown in 
donor confidence.  From the Tanzanian point of view the breakdown was perceived to be due 
to excessive donor demands and failure to deliver on promises (Helleiner 2002: 251). 
From 1991 to 1994 per capita income growth was negative and was associated with declining 
support from aid donors culminating in the cancellation of the adjustment programme by the 
IMF.  Nevertheless the reform process continued.  Freedom of entry and exit in the financial 
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  The exchange rate in relation to the US$ was devalued from TSh. 17 to TSh. 46 in 1986. 
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sector was allowed after two acts in 1991 and 1992 and the process of restructuring and 
privatising the major banks commenced.  Liberalisation of the agricultural sector involved 
opening up marketing to the private sector, removing fertiliser subsidies and scaling down the 
activities of the crop marketing parastatals.  By 1994, eight years after the 1986 agreement 
with the IMF, the first clear signs of a significant positive response from foreign investors 
could be seen with Net FDI increasing to $50 million. 
Liberalisation of the financial and agricultural sectors had some negative impacts.  Although 
liberalisation of marketing had some positive impacts on the producers‟ share of export 
prices, the costs of inputs rose sharply and access to credit deteriorated.  This process led to 
varied outcomes (Winter-Nelson and Temu 2002) but it is likely that it exacerbated inequality 
because poorer farmers are less likely to be able to finance the cost of their inputs and less 
likely to be able to negotiate favourable prices for their outputs (World Bank 1996: 65).   
Banda (1997: 173) suggested that the market reforms created problems because of the 
withdrawal of public sector and co-operative institutions before sufficient time had elapsed to 
allow the development of private sector institutions
29
.  Participants in the 1995 participatory 
poverty assessment (PPA) undertaken for the World Bank (1996) mentioned input supply 
problems and lack of credit as important constraints (ibid: 85-7).  While the state owned 
banking system did not provide a good service to its customers, the liberalisation process led 
to closure of loss-making branches and switches in sectoral lending away from agricultural 
marketing (Nyagatera and Tarimo 1997: 75, 88).  The result has been greater concentration of 
financial services in the large towns while more remote areas now get no service at all.   
                                                 
29
  On the other hand Cooksey (2003) argues that the remnants of the parastatal and co-operative based 
marketing systems restricted the space for the development of private sector provision of marketing and 
input supply services.  Either way the transition was not a smooth one and the experience reinforces the 
point that how institutional change is introduced can be as important as the decision to make such a change. 
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In 1995 a new government was elected and negotiations with the IMF resumed culminating 
in a new enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) in 1996.  The process of agreement 
was enhanced by the appointment of an independent group to review the relationship between 
the Tanzanian government and donors in order to improve the efficiency, relevance and 
effectiveness of aid programmes.  The group proposed measures to ensure that agreements 
could be set out clearly in such a way that the performance of both the Tanzanian government 
and the donors could be monitored against agreed statements.  It was hoped that this would 
enhance the „ownership‟ of the reforms by the Tanzanian government.  Their report (the 
Helleiner Report) contributed to the development of a number of policy documents including 
the Tanzania National Development Vision 2025 (1997) and the National Poverty 
Eradication Strategy (1998).  Relations with donors were defined in the Tanzania Assistance 
Strategy (TAS) (2000) in line with the newly required Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP).  Although some of the original proposals of the consultative group have been eroded 
to some extent it appears that the TAS has helped to establish a more genuine dialogue 
between the donors and the Tanzanian government backed up by a renewed level of aid 
support. 
The economic performance of Tanzania started to improve in 1995 and this improvement has 
accelerated since 2000.  Exports per capita are rising thanks to considerable growth of 
exports of minerals and fish.  Government recognition of the importance of exports and the 
need for diversification is reflected in a new National Trade Policy (2003).  Invisible earnings 
from tourism have risen and FDI is finally becoming a significant factor.  In the social field 
primary school enrolment rates have started to rise again (Table 2, Figure 2), partly due to 
abolition of school fees in 2000.  The proportion of the population proceeding to secondary 
and tertiary education is also now rising, albeit from a very low base.  HIV/AIDS remains a 
serious problem and as yet there is no indication of any significant improvement in the 
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situation, but in most other respects it appears that Tanzania is on the road to sustained 
economic growth with some positive impact in the proportion of the population in absolute 
poverty
30
.   
However, while the overall picture is generally positive, there are some doubts about 
sustainability.  Tanzania is still very aid dependent and a long way from current account 
balance.  Growth in foreign exchange earnings is mainly from minerals and fish exports and 
tourism and there are some concerns that these industries have relatively weak internal 
linkages as well as fairly high levels of outward leakage.  Recent moves to strengthen 
economic cooperation with neighbouring countries have not yet resulted in substantial trade 
flows.  A more general issue is the question of the whether market driven reforms can deliver 
poverty reduction to the poorest groups or whether they actually make the position of these 
groups worse. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Tanzania has been through a range of reforms over the last forty to fifty years with mixed but 
generally disappointing results between two short periods of rapid growth.  It easy to dismiss 
Tanzania‟s „socialist experiment‟ as an expensive mistake but it is worth considering what 
were the critical factors and to what extent the current reforms are addressing the most 
important issues for the future.     
The most problematic period from a policy point of view was the period from 1973-9.  It is 
necessary to recognise the significant changes in the political context that took place in this 
period.  In this period Tanzania received increasing amounts of aid at a time when the terms 
of trade were generally favourable.  The Tanzanian government had adopted a form of state 
socialism in which the ideologically driven extension of the role of the state went well 
                                                 
30
  The basic needs poverty headcount ratio for Tanzania fell from 38.6 to 35.7 between 1991/2 and 2000/1 
(URT 2002a: 7) 
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beyond the operational capacity for administration.  The control of prices, marketing and 
resources and widespread resort to rationing led initially to inefficiency and as shortages 
became more acute it created opportunities for patronage and rent seeking by parastatal 
managers and government officials.  Bevan et al. (1990: 306) point out that the windfall gain 
from the coffee boom of the mid 1970s merely postponed the consequences of an 
increasingly unsustainable policy.  The irony is that this extension of the role of the state was 
actively supported by the same institutions that changed their tune following the demise of 
Robert McNamara‟s basic needs agenda and the advent of structural adjustment (Holtom 
2005: 558).  As Van Arkadie (2003: 3) argues in relation to both structural adjustment and 
subsequent „development fashions‟: 
“Unpredictable shifts in donor fashions have become one powerful source of exogenous 
instability affecting policy making in heavily aid-dependent economies…….For a 
country such as Tanzania it may seem somewhat ironic that officials are now lectured 
on the need to emphasise poverty alleviation, long the established priority of Tanzanian 
policy by the same institutions that had pushed policies that had led to downgrading of 
basic needs priorities in the not too distant past.”  
From an economic point of view the most problematic period was 1979-85, but this would 
almost certainly have been difficult whatever the circumstances because of the hostile 
external environment with rapidly deteriorating terms of trade, declining levels of aid and 
rising problems with debt service derived from high real rates of interest in the developed 
world.  The relationship between Tanzania and the donor agencies was confrontational, not 
only because the Tanzanian leadership was intransigent on the exchange rate issue but also 
because the donors were reluctant to compromise.  A more sympathetic encouragement of the 
domestically driven reform programme or at least willingness to compromise on some issues 
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might have strengthened the position of the reformers in Tanzania and led to a more realistic 
response in relation to exchange rate adjustment. 
Opposition to reform was not only an issue of national sovereignty.  It also involved defence 
of vested interests for the „bureaucratic bourgeoisie‟ who benefited from access to resources 
in a period of scarcity.  While the political leadership may have taken a stand on the principle 
of national sovereignty they were supported by groups who were potential losers from market 
driven reforms.  It is therefore scarcely surprising that issues of economic mismanagement or 
governance arose in the post reform era.  
In general the reforms since 1986 seem to have worked, but it took nearly ten years before 
there was any significant progress in terms of per capita income and export performance.  
Meanwhile some social indicators actually deteriorated while others remained more or less 
unchanged despite rising incomes
31
.  While the general direction of the reforms is widely 
accepted there are issues about the speed, the order of their introduction and how far they 
have to go to ensure an environment that is conducive to pro-poor growth.  
It is clear that the overvaluation of the Tanzanian exchange rate in the 1980s was a serious 
problem and that a process of adjustment was needed.  What is not clear is whether a „big 
bang‟ approach involving an immediate 63% devaluation was the most appropriate way to 
start the adjustment process.  While there was an immediate export boom in 1986, real 
exports did not return to the 1986 real value until 1995.  Part of the reason may have been 
that the export industries were in such a parlous state that the rapid devaluation made the 
local currency cost of investing in rehabilitation prohibitively expensive.  The local currency 
cost of borrowing in foreign currency is also significantly increased by rapid devaluation.  
                                                 
31
  Gross primary school enrolment did not stop falling until 1998.  Infant mortality rates increased for a period 
after 1985, although it could be argued that this was associated with the rise in HIV/AIDS, a factor that 
cannot be attributed to the reforms (RAWG 2002: 26-7).  Indicators of child malnourishment have seen little 
change (ibid: 36-7). 
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Very rapid change in exchange rates is also destabilising in that it increases uncertainty.  A 
very rapid depreciation leads to potential overshooting and the possibility that the process 
might be reversed, thereby reducing incentives to exporters at a time when maintaining 
profitability could be crucial.  This happened in Tanzania from 1992 to 1998 when the RER 
appreciated after falling to its lowest ever level.  Evidence from Uganda suggests that while 
exports are negatively correlated with the RER, uncertainty associated with exchange rate 
variability also has a negative effect on exports (Cameron, Kihangire and Potts 2005).  This 
would suggest that a more careful exchange rate strategy might be required than simply 
removing overvaluation at the earliest possible opportunity. 
A second example where questions can be asked about the speed of change relates to the 
liberalisation of financial and agricultural markets.  While it was clear that the introduction of 
the private sector in these areas could eventually bring improvements in efficiency it is not so 
clear that the rapid withdrawal of public sector institutional structures was the most effective 
way to achieve such a transition.  It takes time for farmers to adapt to new institutional 
structures as well as for a poorly developed private sector to extend its role
32
.  
The issue of speed relates also to the issue of the order in which things are done.  Morrissey 
(1995: 647) pointed out the need to “identify the policy environment first, then assess which 
reforms are appropriate to that environment, notably building institutional capacity….. 
Countries with greater capacity and/or commitment can move faster.”  While he argued that 
the majority of reforms were basically successful, he pointed to problems in tax 
administration and in the capacity for privatisation and the reform of the parastatals, in part 
due to the weakness of the private sector.  In any reform process it is important to be aware of 
the status and perceived legitimacy of local institutions and their capacity to deliver. 
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  “A crop parastatal can be privatised at the stroke of a pen, but it will take a lot longer than this to establish an 
energetic, competitive, efficient and responsive private marketing system.” (Ellis and Mdoe 2003: 1379) 
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The weakness of the private sector in Tanzania leads us back to the quotations at the 
beginning of this paper.  A major stated reason for the Arusha Declaration was the perceived 
failure of the private sector to deliver the investment the government was looking for.  In 
hindsight the impatience of the Tanzanian government may be considered unjustified, but an 
equally significant factor was probably the issue of ownership.  The private sector was 
predominantly owned by foreigners and relatively privileged ethnic minorities.  The 
indigenous population owned relatively little.  After nearly thirty years of socialist oriented 
policies it is hardly surprising that local private sector capacity was weak or that Tanzania 
was regarded with suspicion by foreign investors.  For the World Bank to place too much 
expectation on the private sector to deliver a substantial increase in investment even in the 
medium term, as is implied in the third quotation, was just as unrealistic as Nyerere‟s implicit 
assumption that the role of the state could be massively extended without major investment in 
human capital.   
The ideological drive to downsize the state by privatising wherever possible and as soon as 
possible makes an implicit assumption that the supply of private sector funds is highly elastic.  
This was certainly not the case for the indigenous private sector in the early years of reform 
because savings rates were relatively low, the banking system was not well developed and the 
stock exchange was non-existent.  It is also clear that the interest of foreign investors was not 
particularly strong and has tended to be concentrated in a small number of areas such as 
mining and tourism where the prospect of repatriating funds is relatively good. 
The questions of what to privatise and when are therefore important and should be driven 
primarily by practical considerations related to the maximisation of overall efficiency in the 
use of scarce resources.  A relevant factor in this respect is the fact that the most attractive 
state enterprises from the point of view of private investors are those that are performing 
relatively well and have guaranteed markets.  While there is no doubt that many Tanzanian 
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parastatals were badly managed and inefficient, there was considerable variation in their 
performance
33
.  From the point of view of the government it is the enterprises that are failing 
and operating in an uncertain environment that are the ones most in need of external 
investment.  The implications of the inherent contradiction between what is most helpful to 
the government and what is most attractive to the private sector need careful consideration, 
especially if the supply of private sector capital is regarded as limited rather than infinitely 
elastic
34
. 
The word „ownership‟ can be used in two ways.  One is in the sense of „ownership‟ of the 
reform process.  It appears that the process instigated by the Helleiner Report has gone some 
way to increasing the extent to which policy is now being driven by the Tanzanian 
government (Killick 2004: 233).  For this to be effective it is important that there should be 
some genuine policy options.  While it is legitimate for the donor community to be concerned 
with the standard of overall macroeconomic management and the effectiveness with which 
funds are being used, there should be greater scope for the government to decide on issues 
such as how to raise revenue and what roles should remain within the public sector.  Ensuring 
the coherence and effectiveness of state intervention is more important than minimising the 
role of the state. 
The second use of the word „ownership‟ relates to the ownership of assets.  There is growing 
evidence that lack of ownership of (or entitlement to) assets, in particular land, is an 
important factor underlying the poverty of the poorest Tanzanians (Ellis and Mdoe 2003: 
1379).  There is some evidence that the liberalisation process has increased rather than 
reduced inequality and that in the agricultural sector it is the richest farmers who have gained 
                                                 
33
  Some examples of such variation in agricultural parastatals are described in Potts (1995). 
34
  An early example of this issue (1986) was the pressure to privatise the most efficient public sector tea estate 
at a time when there were other public sector estates in much greater need of rehabilitation.  A compromise 
was reached by including a run down estate in the package. 
 35 
most.  This is likely to exacerbate the process of concentration of land, especially in those 
areas where land is becoming increasingly scarce.   
The proportion of the population living in the urban areas has increased dramatically from 
5.2% in 1960 to 24.2% in 2005 with a concomitant increase in the importance of the urban 
informal sector (WDI 2006).  The proportion of the population living in the urban areas grew 
most rapidly from 6.4% in 1966 to 14.6% in 1980 and more slowly thereafter.  A major issue 
for the future is the extent to which the industrial and service sectors can provide gainful 
employment for this rising population.  It is quite possible that the increasing proportion of 
productive capacity in the hands of foreign companies will re-emerge as a political issue if 
there are no signs of „trickle down‟ to the wider population. 
An important factor in the assessment of the limitations of the Tanzanian economy 
throughout has been the limited development of human capital.  Tanzania has been praised 
for the achievements of a very poor country in terms of primary education and literacy.  
However this has to some extent been at the expense of secondary and tertiary education 
where participation rates are among the lowest in the world.  A successful transformation of 
the Tanzanian economy cannot take place without a substantial increase in the proportion of 
the labour force with education beyond primary level. 
Overall the outlook is quite encouraging but the current rate of growth cannot be sustained 
without consistent support from the donor community combined with rather than as a 
substitute for continued revival and diversification of foreign exchange earnings.  Perhaps the 
most important single conclusion is that drastic changes in the policies of both host country 
and donors accompanied in the latter case by rapid in changes in the level of support are 
disruptive to aid-dependent economies.   
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Annex A  Construction of the GDP Series 
 
The data used for the period 1967 to 2002 are taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics (various issues from 1985) and therefore should be internally consistent.  However 
it should be noted that there are some inconsistencies.  The series were joined at points where 
there appeared to be reasonable consistency in terms of growth from one year to the next with 
more recent estimates taking precedence.  They were updated to 2005 using the World 
Development Indicators (2006).  The data used for 1954 to 1967 are taken from World Bank 
(1994) and are not entirely consistent with the IMF series.  The series were joined using a 
consistency check for the overlapping years (1965-7).  Inevitably given the length of time 
covered the margin of error in all such figures should be recognised.  A particular issue for 
the period 1961-7 is the union with Zanzibar in 1964, which makes comparison between 
1961-3 and 1964-7 potentially problematic.  By concentrating on per capita rather than 
absolute estimates of GDP the margin of error is reduced sufficiently to allow general 
conclusions to be drawn.  Another issue is the upward adjustment of the series that took place 
in the 1990s.  By utilising what should be a consistent series from 1967 onwards and working 
backwards using growth rates rather than absolute values while checking for consistency in 
overlapping years, the series should be reasonably consistent.  Useful discussions of the 
issues arising in compiling long series for Tanzania can be found in Bigsten and Danielsson 
1999:8 and Ellis and Mdoe 2003.  A significant margin of error must be accepted in figures 
covering such a long time period but it is argued that the orders of magnitude are sufficiently 
accurate to make judgements about trends during the periods identified. 
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Annex B  Compilation of the Import (IUV) and Export (XUV) Unit Value Series 
To obtain a single series for the IUV and XUV to cover the whole period it was necessary to 
join different series together.  The limitations of joining series together when there are 
changes in the patterns of both expenditure on imports and export composition are recognised 
and clearly there are implications for the margin of error in the results indicated.  There are 
many series covering different periods but none that cover the whole period in question.  
Reference was made to the IMF International Financial Statistics (1976) and to various 
editions of the World Bank Tables, World Development Indicators and African Development 
Indicators.  The level of inconsistency in the various series is remarkable but not entirely 
surprising given changes in trade composition over such a long period.  The series finally 
adopted was assembled on the basis of some general principles.  These were: 
i) There should not be too many joints in the series. 
ii) There should not be too much inconsistency between the series at the points where 
joints are made. 
iii) The most recent and the oldest values in the series are likely to be the least reliable 
in the former case because of subsequent statistical revisions and in the latter case 
because of changes in trade composition. 
iv) For consistency the joints should be made in the same years for both IUV and 
XUV series. 
The series adopted was based on IMF (1976) for the period 1961-70, World Tables (1987, 
1993 and 1995) for the period 1971-1990 and derived from World Development 
Indicators (2006) for the period from 1991 onwards.  The margin of error for the most 
recent period is particularly great because of significant changes in trade structure, 
particularly for exports. 
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Annex C  Compilation of the Real Exchange Rate Series 
As with other series it was necessary to join a number of series together.  Data for the period 
from 1961 to 1980 were derived from Krumm (1993), which in turn is based on IMF data.  
Data for the period 1981 to 1991 were derived from the World Bank African Development 
Indicators (1992 and 1998/9).  Data for the period from 1992 to 2002 were derived from the 
World Bank Africa Database (2004).  The final two years were derived from IMF (2005).  
Data from World Bank (1994) were referred to for cross-checking.  
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Figure 1 Index of Per Capita GDP in Tanzania 
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  Sources:  Compiled from:  World Development Indicators (2006) 
   IMF International Financial Statistics (various issues)  
  World Bank (1994) 
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Figure 2  Social Indicators of Development for Tanzania 
1960-2004
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Sources:  World Bank Africa Database 2004   
            World Development Indicators 2005 and 2006 
Note:       All series have missing years, which have been included by extrapolation between data points 
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Figure 3  Per Capita Sources of Foreign Exchange 
1961-2004 ($US constant 1961 prices)
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Sources:  Own estimates based on World Bank, IMF and Tanzanian government sources 
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Figure 4 Indices of Volume per Capita and Real Unit 
Value for Six Major Export Crops (1965-2004)
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Source:  Own estimates based on World Bank, IMF and Bank of Tanzania data 
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Figure 5  Commodity Terms of Trade for Tanzania 
1957-2004 (1961=100)
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Source:  Own estimates based on World Bank, IMF and Bank of Tanzania data 
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Figure 6  Index of Real Aid Per Capita 1961-2004 
(1961=100)
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Source:  Own estimates derived from World Development Indicators (2006) 
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Figure 7  Gross Fixed Investment and Economic Growth 
1962-2004
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Source: Own estimates based on World Bank sources 
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Figure 8 Index of Real Exchange Rate (1961 = 100)
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Source: Own estimates based on World Bank and IMF sources 
